tions and bases is provided by the Defense Information Systems Agency, discussed later in this article. Each of the Services is responsible for training computer operators and administrators, as well as securing their computers and networks.
The Navy has the unique challenge of running local networks shipboard and connecting these mobile platforms to the widearea backbone via satellite, and in some cases slow radio links ( Table 1) . The Army and Marines regularly install and maintain tactical networks in the field. Their problem is the exact opposite of the Navy's. While their wide area network connections seldom move, the ground units and their local area networks move regularly, in some cases nearly constantly. While these ground tactical networks often use standard or ruggedized commercial equipment, and the wide-area links in the rear areas are also commercial grade, the link speeds between forward deployed tactical unit networks and the well provisioned rear areas use tactical communications systems designed in the 1980s or earlier. These systems do not always provide high-speed connectivity. This variety not only provides unique communications challenges but also very distinctive security problems. For example, distributing security patches to ships at sea or mobile combat units is problematic because of link speed bottlenecks at one or more locations.
The Services have the unenviable tasks of giving their users the latest software and also making sure the latest security patches are installed on every machine. The fact that most Defense Department computers use Microsoft products makes these tasks a little simpler, with the recurring security problems in these products being an annoyance. Additionally, the administrator's graphical interface on Microsoft products makes it simpler to train administrators to do basic tasks. Although most Defense Department computer systems are Microsoft-based, some computing systems are UNIX-or Linux-based. Several command and control systems, as well as important logistics systems, are UNIX-based. Contrary to popular myths, UNIX systems have security problems too. The smaller number of UNIX systems is offset by the fact that the Defense Department uses several UNIX flavors: Solaris, HP-UX, OpenBSD, and so on, as well as the usual Linux suspects. Finding and correcting security vulnerabilities for each of the smaller number of platforms is nearly as difficult for the much larger numbers of Microsoft machines. Additionally, some UNIX (notably not Linux) operating system vendors are simply not responsive about correcting known problems. One UNIX vendor considers itself more of a "hardware than an operating system company"; the firm is regularly months later than other UNIX vendors when releasing operating system security patches.
A key computer security unit within each of the military Services is the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). When a computer security incident occurs, the local installation reports the incident to the Service's CERT. The CERT and local units work together to properly handle the incident and take the appropriate remedial action. These remedial actions not only include correcting the problem but also providing information to the law enforcement or intelligence communities. Each of the Services has a chief information officer (CIO) responsible for coordinating all these efforts within the Service.
In addition to the four Services, there are also several separate Defense Agencies: the Defense Logistics, Defense Commissary, Defense Intelligence, and Defense Threat Reduction Agencies are a few. These agencies maintain and secure their own local networks in a manner similar to the Services. Their job appears a little easier because these agencies are normally fixed-site administrative and analysis activities. However, many of them have an extensive Internet presence that makes them more visible and more reliant on network services. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency has done a tremendous job moving from a paperbased contracting environment to "E-Government," significantly lowering costs. Unfortunately, reducing or removing their Internet connectivity significantly affects the system. The individual Defense Agencies also have a CIO with duties similar to the Service CIOs.
Higher-Level Control Activities
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) provides network backbone and long-haul communications links that interconnect the Services, Agencies, and field units. DISA has approximately 8000 employees worldwide. 1 DISA's main organizations in data network security and management are the Defense Department's Computer Emergency Response Team (DoD-CERT) and the DISA Global Network Operations Center (GNOSC). These two operations centers work together to track network availability and computer intrusions and other threats, such as viruses and worms.
A third organization with which the DoD-CERT and GNOSC work is the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO). The JTF-CNO has the specific mission of executing tactical and operational network defense for all Defense Department networks and computers. The JTF-CNO has the authority to direct changes in router settings, authorize specific packet filtering settings at the interconnection points between military networks and the Internet, prioritize security patch installations, and direct how the military reacts to new threats (e.g., the recent Code Red and Nimda worms). The JTF-CNO does not make computer security policies (this is done by ASD-C3I), but may recommend policy changes. Because the Commander of the JTF-CNO is "dual hatted" as the DISA Deputy Director, the GNOSC, DoD-CERT, and JTF-CNO are not only collocated but also work together as a team to monitor, analyze, and implement computer security actions on the Defense Department's networks. 2 Personnel All of the higher-level commands rely on reports and actions from the lowest levels. Unit, local, and regional system administrators and computer security personnel fill this role. An important factor in managing the networks is the average administrator's I training and experience level. Most companies, colleges, or universities have difficulties finding trained and experienced administrators. In addition to the normal issues other employers face, the military has frequent moves, mandatory military training (e.g., marksmanship and field exercises), and the occasional deployment to hostile fire zones. However, the toughest problem the Defense Department has is the pay difference between the civilian and military sectors. A military system administrator is doing well if he or she earns the rank of E-5 within their first three to four years of service. A soldier or sailor of this rank earns approximately $28,000 a year; it is little wonder that people enlist, receive several years of training and experience, and leave the military for much better pay. 3 The fact that in July 2002 the Army placed soldiers and officers in the most critical computer specialties into a "stop loss" category that requires them to continue on active duty indefinitely -the same wartime category as Special Forces soldiers and Arabic linguists -is an indicator of the computer specialists' value, as well as the difficulty in retaining them. Each of the services has their own military training programs for its uniformed and civilian computer administrators. Where it is appropriate civilian training is used. The administrative personnel the military services have are generally motivated and hard working. The largest drawback is training and experience. When a soldier or sailor is trained and experienced on the local system, it is nearly always time for them to leave for one reason or another.
There are many important security organizations and functions I have overlooked in this brief overview. For example, there is neither time nor space to cover the role of regional combatant commands (e.g., CENTCOM) in network security. 4 However, I have tried to provide a clear description of the Defense Department's fundamental network architecture, policy, and execution bodies.
Implementing Security
Network defense currently focuses on preventative and remedial actions, similar to the commercial sector. The Defense Department has programs to provide for individual machine protection, 5 boundary protection, and filtering where the NIPRNET interconnects with the Internet, a robust program to manage security patches throughout the Department, and a comprehensive system to report intrusions and system vulnerabilities.
Boundary Filtering
Boundary filtering is provided by DISA at the NIPRNET gateways that connect to the Internet. There are approximately 25 of these interconnection points. The filtering currently done is relatively limited, generally only the TCP "small services" 6 and a few other ports with known vulnerabilities that do not need to be open to the Internet (e.g., Simple Network Management Protocol, SNMP). Recognizing this as a potential vulnerability, the Defense Department is looking at what types of services should be "provided" to Internet users in a Ports and Protocols study. For example, telnet allows remote users to connect to Defense computers with a command line interface via an unencrypted communications link. Few users require this type of interface, and an encrypted replacement-Secure Shell (SSH), which has several free or inexpensive variants, exists. Logically, all port 23 telnet connections can be blocked at the network connection points to the Internet. Coincidentally, telnet packets make up ~0.5 percent of all packets entering the NIPRNET.
Decisions regarding the filter settings are made by the JTF-CNO in conjunction with its higher headquarters. These decisions strongly rely on recommendations from the DoD-CERT. Filtering actions are overseen by the DISA GNOSC and executed by DISA's field elements and, in some cases, by the military Services and Agencies.
Security Patches
Managing security patches for the Defense Department is done through the Internet Assurance and Vulnerability Assessment (IAVA) program. Dozens of new security vulnerabilities are discovered weekly with software patches for these vulnerabilities released some time later. Implementing all of these patches is simply unworkable because of the size of Defense Department networks. Instead, the DoD-CERT carefully reviews all vulnerabilities and chooses those vulnerabilities that truly pose a credible threat to the Defense Networks. In some cases, an IAVA bulletin is issued across the Department requiring a configuration change or software patch installation within a specified time. This type of IAVA announcement is fairly rare (only 15 were issued in 2001) because they are disruptive to the network. IAVA advisories that recommend a change in practice, configuration, or a less critical security patch are more common. The IAVA system is currently managed with the normal technical chain of command and works well. The Defense Department does have some intrusions from improperly configured machines and from machines missing required security patches, but the number of these incidents is lower than in the civilian sector.
Dealing with an Attack
When someone does break into a Defense Department computer system or unleashes a new worm that affects the Internet -and possibly the NIPRNET -there is a clear plan of action to follow that everyone understands and practices regularly. Not only are these procedures followed for real security incidents, they are also used increasingly during military exercises. The procedures are fairly straightforward to anyone familiar with the military: detect the attack, report the contact to higher headquarters, stop the attack, and repair the damage. There are other steps involved -working with law enforcement officials for one -but these are the key items.
The most difficult of these tasks is detecting the attack. Defenders cannot "see the enemy coming" in a conventional sense and usually must wait until an attacker actually does something malicious. For example, scanning a network for vulnerabilities is not a criminal offense in many jurisdictions, while exploiting a vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to a computer is illegal. A defender typically detects an attack either with an intrusion detection system that looks for known types of attacks or by observing unusual activity or files on the network. An "arms race" exists today between intrusion detection systems and attackers either sidestepping or fooling the intrusion detection systems, the two sides regularly exchanging the advantage. Some attacks are always difficult to detect. A denial of service attack that saturates communications links with legitimate traffic may not trigger an intrusion detection system because nothing is "unusual" except for the amount of traffic. In this case, only someone monitoring the link utilization rate or a user who notices that things on the network are "slowing down" may call attention to the attack. Once this kind of attack, or any other type of attack, is detected, the actions that need to be followed (reporting the attack and taking corrective actions) are clearcut.
Reporting
One problem the Defense Department currently has is when subordinate units report the contact or intrusion: some forces report immediately, while others report only when all other corrective steps are completed. The latter causes intrusion reports to "pop up" weeks after security patches or other corrective actions were reportedly in place. In fact, the intrusions took place before the warning went out or patch was available, and the patches or other remedies were installed when required, but the late reporting of the intrusion confuses matters.
The reporting chain for the normal installation or base is a dual chain. The reporting chain is to both the operational chain of command and the technical chain of command. The operational commander (e.g., the base or unit commander) is of course informed. Similarly, the Service or Agency CERT, or a regional CERT if one is present, is notified and technically manages the incident with the base or unit administrators. The Service or regional CERT reports the intrusion to the DoD-CERT and JTF-CNO. These two elements track the progress of the incident and provide any assistance the Service or Agency cannot provide itself. Additionally, the JTF-CNO's Law Enforcement and Counter-Intelligence cell tracks the incident if it enters the law enforcement system and is allowed to coordinate directly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and other non-Defense Department law enforcement cells to enable successful prosecutions.
In summary, the defensive system is just that: defensive. There is no opportunity or mechanism for computer security forces to mount a counteroffensive, unlike normal military operations. Methods like "hack back" and "honey pots" raise too many U.S. and international legal and policy issues, as well as training and execution problems, to be seriously considered today. Nonetheless, the defensive system protects the networks adequately and is well understood by its participants. The key question to answer is how the current system needs to adapt to new threats and technology.
Key Security Issues
Security issues facing the Defense Department fall into two distinct categories: technical and procedural. In some cases the two are intertwined. The technical issues are by far the easiest to solve. The procedural and entwined problems are more difficult to correct.
The most important -and currently unsolved -technical issues to correct are automatic vulnerability scanning and reporting, automatic patch installation (i.e., configuration management), wireless network security, and an integrated sensor grid.
Configuration Management and Vulnerability Detection
The number of machines the Defense Department must maintain and track is a configuration management nightmare. Choosing and enforcing a standard configuration is difficult. While vulnerability scanners tell administrators which machines lack required security patches, current scanners do not inform any chain of command for security problems or require any action on their part. Similarly, security patch installation is not trivial, often requiring a specific installation order to work correctly. This order may not be the same on all machines and may occasion administrators to visit every machine. Basic software installation is also a time-consuming process. Rebuilding or replacing machines requires reinstalling all software and all the patches in the proper order. These two problems can be solved by having base or regional level vulnerability scanners and software/patch installers that can detect and correct problems automatically. This is a difficult problem to solve technically, fraught with peril (imagine an adversary gaining control of the software update distribution system), and needs significant work.
Wireless Security
Another technical area the Defense Department is working on is wireless networking security. The lower infrastructure costs and ability to move workstations or entire LANs will greatly decrease network setup times, particularly for tactical units. Unfortunately, most current wireless solutions do not fit our needs. The 802.11B wireless standard, the most prevalent today, uses a faulty implementation of the RC4 stream cipher and is inherently too insecure for classified or sensitive data. The next generation, 802.11A, while providing more bandwidth, has too short of a range to be much use. What the military needs is a commercial wireless technology with strong authentication, sound encryption, and a range making it tactically viable (e.g., a usable signal strength after passing 300 m in heavy vegetation is desirable). Some devices like this exist today, but they are not common and cost an order of magnitude more than normal wireless cards. Hopefully, less expensive commercial cards will become available as wireless networks become more common.
Integrated Sensors
The integrated sensor grid is a technical integration problem. The Defense Department has a wide distribution of firewalls (perimeter, internal LAN, and host-based), virus checkers, and intrusion detection systems. The fact that no military Service necessarily uses the same brand or configuration makes the overall network defenses very robust; breaking into one network does not generally provide access to others. Unfortunately, it also makes integrating these different systems into a single real-time view of the Defense Department's networks difficult. The data is available, but the collation and integration of the data, as well as the means to display thousands of systems in an understandable way, is lacking. Efforts are underway to address each of these technical problems.
Process and Procedural Issues
Integrating technical solutions with major architectural, process, or organizational changes is difficult. An important project DISA is working on with the Services and Agencies is to establish true DMZ enclaves. 7 As the NIPRNET and the Internet grew in the last decade, customer services and functionality grew by leaps and bounds. The military often fol- lowed normal "best" commercial practices. One of these practices was the proliferation of Web servers to enable e-commerce (e.g., contract administration and logistics management) and provide information to the public. Web servers sprang up at every base and installation, normally within the local base's DMZ. There is no NIPRNET-level DMZ because the bases are interconnected and the traffic cannot be adequately screened at the perimeters. This makes shielding NIPRNET from attack difficult. DISA is trying to establish regional DMZs at the different NIPRNET/Internet interconnection points and move all the Web servers that provide services to Internet customers to these DMZs. This is a difficult problem that is mostly a process issue. Designing the architecture, and purchasing and installing the firewalls, proxy servers, and application servers are straightforward technically. Deciding who will run and pay for the DMZs, and convincing the different Services and Agencies it is in their best interest to move all Web and application servers to the DMZs are not straightforward, but DISA, with support from the JTF-CNO, is making headway on this difficult problem.
While the DMZ problem is a technology issue that requires procedural and organizational changes to work correctly, an important issue with the opposite precedence, a process change that needs technical assistance, lies hidden. The military increasingly relies on automated systems. A person only needs to watch television coverage of the war against terrorism to get an idea of that reliance. The military regularly trains to protect those systems. What is not being done widely is security testing of developmental systems. Too often systems are fielded that work correctly and do everything they were designed to do, but once in the field they are susceptible to the normal operating system and application-level security flaws. The military testing community historically tests equipment and hardware to ensure the devices or programs work correctly; they do not test the underlying computer systems and application software looking for inherent vulnerabilities. Testing proprietary military programs is even more important because of their criticality. Currently, at least one Service is seeking assistance in is this area, knowing they must address the problem but having a shortage of trained penetration and vulnerability testers. The key to correcting this problem is to place vulnerability assessments early in the development process, fixing problems early in the development and prototyping stages, not after the systems are fielded, relied on, and being depended on.
Command Responsibility
The final problem long-term problem facing the Defense Department is purely process-oriented; I call it the "chain of command" problem. Earlier I mentioned the separate operational and technical chains of command. Any military student or common sense business executive knows the importance of unity of command. This principle is not currently applied to computing systems where they support operational efforts. While computers and automated systems are increasingly relied on heavily for combat, command and control, and logistics support, administering and protecting these automation systems is not always seen as relevant by the operational commanders.
For example, tactical field and combat units submit regular reports on their combat readiness. These reports detail items such as marksmanship, gunnery qualifications, vehicle maintenance and availability, and air crew training. Items not found are computer availability, operating system currency, application and security patch installation rates, administrator certification levels, and so on.
Another indicator of the duality in the command structure is "who" is held responsible for a computer security problem. Inevitably, the person held responsible today is the administrator, possibly the next person up the technical chain of command, not the unit or base operational commander. This is not the case for normal equipment like vehicles and aircraft. In those cases, the unit commander is expected to have a viable training, maintenance, and safety program. Single incidents, be they accidents or maintenance problems, may be the fault of a careless individual, but repeated problems fall squarely on the local commander. It is the task of the local or higher unit commanders to correct these systemic problems or be removed from command. So, if the military deals with normal maintenance problems this way, why are computers and software systems different?
The primary problem lies with leaders relying on an apparatus and not understanding why the device works and the complexities associated with it. In short, the leaders want to use the device but are uncomfortable dealing with its complexities. This is not a new problem. 8 The current phase will eventually change to where automation systems are recognized and managed, not just used, as combat multipliers and weapons systems. While this change is inevitable, given our dependence on automation systems, their vulnerability, and the ease with which they can be damaged, it is important that this change -holding commanders responsible for protecting their systems and not just using them -be made as quickly as possible, not just inevitably.
Conclusion
This article provides a short introduction to how the U.S. military defends its networks, some of the organizations involved, and some of the problems facing the Defense Department. It is an incomplete tally of the efforts being made by the Defense Department to protect its networks and does no justice to the countless actions done daily by many people and organizations.
I have tried to answer basic questions we regularly get from industry. "How large are your networks and what kind of problems do you have defending them?" "What does your defensive organization look like?" and "What kind of problems do you have and what can we do to help?" The first few sections are devoted to answering those three questions.
Defense networks are large and have many of the same security problems as regular networks; our interconnection to the Internet makes us susceptible to the same threats found there. We defend our networks through solid procedures, practice, and teamwork. These efforts are not always successful, and we continually look for new ways to improve ourselves. These new ways are not limited to ideas from within the military. The military computer security community works closely with the commercial and academic sectors, as well as other government agencies and other countries. A successful computer network defense is difficult, time consuming, and often frustrating. Defense is not nearly as exciting as its sibling, computer network attack, but failing to mount a proper defense will cripple our wartime efforts, while failing to execute a computer network attack against our current adversaries normally only requires another air sortie.
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